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The Charter of the United Nations makes forty-five references to the word “peace.” In the 
vast majority of them, peace is coupled with security – rather than development or human 
rights – in the interdependent phrase “international peace and security” (for example, arts. 
1(1), 2(3), 11(1), 11(2), 11(3), and 12(2)).1 It is no surprise, then, that the Security Council 
continues this linkage in its women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda, which commenced 
in 2000 with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR 1325), the first of its 
thematic resolutions on WPS. In this critical analysis, I historicize the WPS agenda and argue 
that long-standing feminist conceptions of positive peace – which at least some members of 
the coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who lobbied the Security Council 
to adopt SCR 1325 had hoped to thereby promote – have become captive to the militarized 
security frame of the Council’s operation.
The UN Charter includes a small number 
of other references to peace, which 
provide a starting point for re-imagining 
peace outside the “frames of war”2 and 
creating the conditions of possibility for 
non-violence rather than militarism, and an 
appreciation of the equal value of every life. 
In the preamble, the “peoples” of the UN 
commit to “liv[ing] together in peace with 
one another” (para. 2); among the listed 
purposes of the UN is the achievement of 
“universal peace” (art. 1(2)); UN membership 
is open to “peace-loving states” (art. 4(1)); 
and the “peaceful” or “pacific” settlement 
of disputes is prioritized (arts. 1(1), 2(3), 14, 
33–38, 52(2), and 52(3)). These references 
accord with a feminist agenda for peace, the 
core components of which were identified a 
hundred years ago by the Hague Congress of 
Women (Hague Congress), which was held 
in 1915, during the Great War, to develop 
strategies to bring the conflict to a speedy 
conclusion.3 The Congress participants 
outlined a wide-ranging vision of the 
measures they thought necessary to bring 
an end to the “the madness and horror of 
war” and build a “permanent peace”.4 They 
established an International Committee of 
Women for Permanent Peace to pursue their 
goals, which was renamed the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom 
(WILPF) in 1919.5 In 2000, WILPF took the 
lead in persuading the Security Council 
to adopt SCR 1325, and remains actively 
involved in the NGO Working Group on 
Women, Peace and Security (NGO Working 
Group), which promotes the implementation 
of all the WPS resolutions.
While there is much to celebrate about the 
Security Council’s WPS agenda in terms 
of policy and institutional developments, 
admission into the inner sanctum of the 
Security Council’s work has come at some 
cost to feminist goals.6 One cost has been 
a softening of feminist opposition to war, 
evidenced by a shift in the focus of feminist 
peace advocates from strengthening the 
laws that make armed conflict illegal (jus 
ad bellum) to seeking to humanize the 
laws that govern the conduct of armed 
conflict (jus in bello); from aiming to end 
all wars to making wars safer for women. 
The idea that lawful justifications for the 
use of force might even be expanded to 
include protection of the rights of women 
has been endorsed and, while some of 
the long-term goals of feminist peace 
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2advocates appear to have been embraced, 
this engagement has proved to be largely 
“ritualistic,” involving the formal acceptance 
of norms which are then undermined 
through inaction.7 Rather than brokering 
substantive change in the dominant ideas 
and practices of international peace and 
security that conceive of peace primarily 
in military terms, feminist arguments have 
been manipulated to support the expanding 
exercise of unaccountable power by the 
Security Council since the end of the Cold 
War, and legitimize its militaristic and 
carceral approach, in the name of protecting 
women, mostly from sexual violence, and 
promoting their rights. Far from reframing 
our obligations to each other in light of our 
shared (human) precariousness, as Judith 
Butler suggests, the Security Council’s 
approach to peace supports the continued 
expansion of the international market for 
arms, increased powers of state security 
institutions, and more coercive policing of 
expressions of sexuality and gender.8
In order to critically examine the Security 
Council’s vision of WPS, and its impact 
on feminist aspirations for peace, I track 
the fortunes of three of the components 
of permanent peace identified a hundred 
years ago by the Hague Congress: calls 
for the equal participation of women and 
men in conflict-related decision-making, 
universal disarmament, and the adoption 
of measures to prevent the many adverse 
effects of war on women, especially sexual 
violence. In conclusion, I argue for rejecting 
conceptions of peace that are framed solely 
or largely in terms of militarized security 
and, instead, for reviving all of the elements 
of the permanent peace imagined by the 
Hague Congress in 1915, and building on 
their traces that can be found in the UN 
Charter. Feminist peace advocates need to 
rework these elements in light of present day 
arrangements of power and contemporary 
feminist perspectives informed by queer, 
indigenous, and postcolonial politics, and 
think again about the wisdom of looking 
to the Security Council as a vehicle for 
promoting permanent peace.
TRACING THE AGENDA 
FOR PEACE OF THE HAGUE 
CONGRESS OF WOMEN
The twenty interlinked resolutions adopted 
by the Hague Congress provide the backdrop 
for my critique of the Security Council’s 
selective engagement with feminist ideas 
through its work on WPS. Although these 
resolutions bear many markings of their 
time, including maternalist assumptions 
about women’s “natural” proclivity to peace, 
condescending references to colonized 
peoples9, and reliance on the system of 
“neutrality” that was then in place10, they 
nonetheless outline some of the essential 
elements of an international system in which 
resort to arms becomes unthinkable. They 
propose that the right of conquest no longer 
be recognized, that international disputes 
be resolved by mediation or conciliation, 
that states assume obligations to exert 
social, economic and moral pressure on 
any country that resorts to arms, that 
transfer of territory only occurs with the 
consent of the men and women residing 
therein, that foreign policy be democratically 
determined through systems that ensure 
the equal representation of women and 
men, that children be educated in “ideals 
of constructive peace,” and that a series 
of permanent international institutions 
be established in order to settle questions 
of law relating to war, develop practical 
proposals for international cooperation 
among states, and settle economic and 
commercial disputes.11 The resolutions 
explicitly reject the approach of developing 
legal and customary conventions of law to 
“humanize” war (Resolution 2),12 and focus 
squarely on transforming the laws of war so 
that the use of force can never be justified. 
The women who adopted them understood 
peace in the positive sense of creating global 
conditions in which all lives are valued and 
are able to be lived in dignity and equality, 
emphatically rejecting the idea that peace 
is merely the absence of war.
Eighty-five years later, still committed to the 
hope of a world without armed conflict, 
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in which women enjoy equality with men, 
WILPF took a bold initiative. Encouraged by 
the International Women’s Day Statement 
in 2000, by then Security Council President 
Bangladeshi Ambassador Chowdury, which 
linked peace “inextricably” with gender 
equality,13 WILPF assembled a coalition of 
NGOs to persuade the Council to adopt 
a more feminist agenda, by individually 
lobbying its members and drafting an 
initial version of SCR 1325.14 The resolution 
that was eventually adopted in October 
2000 was widely welcomed by feminist 
scholars and activists, who described it as 
a “landmark resolution” representing a 
“new, daring, and ambitious strategy for 
anti-war feminists”15, a “watershed political 
framework”16, and a “significant success 
story” for gender mainstreaming.17 It is 
the only Security Council resolution that 
can boast of translation into dozens of 
languages and a transnational grass roots 
constituency of women’s peace and human 
rights activists, due largely to the efforts of 
the NGO Working Group and WILPF.18 and 
a transnational grass roots constituency of 
women’s peace and human rights activists, 
due largely to the efforts of the NGO Working 
Group and WILPF. Since 2000, a further seven 
thematic WPS resolutions have been adopted 
(as of October 2016). These resolutions can 
be divided into two groups. Four of them 
(SCR 1325, SCR 1889, SCR 2122 and SCR 
2242) focus broadly on issues of concern 
for women during armed conflict and in its 
aftermath, emphasizing the importance of 
women’s participation and the recognition 
of women’s rights (women’s empowerment 
resolutions). The other four resolutions (SCR 
1820, SCR 1888, SCR 1960 and SCR 2106) 
focus exclusively on the issue of protecting 
women (and children, and eventually 
men as well) from sexual violence (sexual 
violence resolutions). Yet even as I group the 
resolutions in this way for the convenience 
of discussion, it is important to acknowledge 
that the women’s empowerment resolutions 
can also be read as primarily protective.19
Among the Hague Congress Resolutions 
are three proposals that I will use to 
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While there is much to celebrate about the Security 
Council’s WPS agenda in terms of policy and institutional 
developments, admission into the inner sanctum of 
the Security Council’s work has come at some cost to 
feminist goals.
critically assess the Security Council’s WPS 
agenda. The first, evident in many of the 
1915 resolutions and linked to the goals 
of the suffrage movement at the time, is 
the demand for the equal participation of 
women in conflict-related decision-making 
(Resolutions 3, 5, 8, 9, 14, 17, 18, and 19). 
There was a strong sense that international 
campaigning could bolster these same 
claims at the national level, as participants 
agreed that “the combined influence of 
the women of all countries is one of the 
strongest forces for the prevention of war” 
(Resolution 9). The second proposal is the 
call for universal and complete disarmament 
and, as an initial step, nationalizing the arms 
industry in order to remove it from private 
ownership and profit-making (Resolution 
12). The third is to halt the “odious wrongs” 
perpetrated against women during armed 
conflict, especially “the horrible violation of 
women that attends all war” (Resolution 
2). These three concerns map onto the 
three core themes of the Security Council 
resolutions – participation, prevention and 
protection – identified initially by WILPF and, 
since then, utilized by the Secretary-General 
to structure his annual reports on WPS.20
41. THE EQUAL 
PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN 
AND MEN (PARTICIPATION)
From an historical perspective, it is clear that 
the Security Council’s promotion of women’s 
increased participation in conflict-related 
decision-making is far from novel. There 
are many earlier examples of international 
institutions formally endorsing this goal. 
They include the Assembly of the League 
of Nations in 1931, which called for increased 
cooperation with women’s organizations in 
the “peace” work of the League, based on the 
assumption that this was an area for which 
women had a special affinity.21 In a similar 
vein, the General Assembly has reiterated 
the importance of women’s participation in 
the maintenance of international peace and 
security many times, including in resolutions 
associated with International Women’s Year 
(1975)22 and adopting the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women in 1979,23 and in the 1982 
Declaration on the Participation of Women 
in Promoting International Peace and 
Cooperation.24  The disconnection between 
these repeated commitments, and the 
continuing reality of women’s exclusion from 
formal processes of international peace and 
security, can aptly be described as a form 
of “ritualism,” whereby states subscribe 
to institutionalized rituals that repeatedly 
affirm certain goals, despite having little or no 
commitment to their substantive realization; 
a term that has been used to describe UN 
human rights processes.25
Yet despite the experience of ritualism, 
and the eventual realization that the 
achievement of voting rights for women 
in domestic politics was not going to make 
war an impossibility, feminist advocacy for 
peace has continued to call for the equal 
participation of women and men in decision-
making associated with conflict resolution 
and peacemaking. Feminists have, however, 
disagreed about the justifications for this 
goal. Some argue for the importance of 
gender equality as a value in itself, while 
others, like the Hague Congress participants, 
take the view that women are “naturally” 
predisposed to peace and thus a stronger 
force (than men) for preventing war.26 Yet 
other feminists have sought to project a 
more social constructionist rationale for 
increasing women’s participation – as 
bringing perspectives to bear on decision-
making from outside the frame of military 
thinking because of their social experiences 
of inequality and disadvantage.27 However, 
even this approach does not entirely resolve 
the dilemma that has always haunted this 
aspect of the feminist agenda for peace: 
that mobilizing as women, to demand 
inclusion in peacemaking processes on 
the basis of women’s present gendered 
experience, as mothers, as victims and, 
more broadly, as marginalized from elite 
power structures, works against the feminist 
agenda for peace which requires disrupting 
those same gender identities because they 
have served to legitimate militarism and 
women’s inequality.28
Despite this conundrum, women’s 
“increased” participation is promoted by 
all eight of the WPS resolutions, although 
the language of “equal” participation 
is undeniably patchy.29 The women’s 
empowerment resolutions all commence 
with provisions that emphasize the need for 
women’s increased participation in formal 
conflict resolution and peace processes, 
including as UN special representatives and 
envoys and in peace support operations 
(SCR 1325, paras. 1–4; SCR 1889, paras. 
1, 4, 19; SCR 2122, paras. 1, 7, 8, 14; SCR 
2242, paras. 1, 7 and 13). Significantly, 
the importance of the conflict resolution 
and peacemaking work of local women’s 
organizations is also recognized, and the 
need to consult with them and draw 
them into formal processes is repeatedly 
emphasized (SCR 1325, paras. 8(b) and 15; 
SCR 1889, para. 10; SCR 2122, preamble 
para. 13, paras. 2(c) and 6; SCR 2242, 
para. 5(c)). Consultation with “socially 
and/or economically excluded groups of 
women” is urged in SCR 2122 (para. 7(c)). 
Increasing the percentage of women in 
military and police contingents deployed in 
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agenda.32 This clearly makes it impossible for 
women’s participation to make a difference 
to the Security Council’s existing lexicon 
of peace. 
 
Mimicking the earlier commitments 
to women’s increased participation in 
promoting and securing international peace– 
whether in an empowered, protective or 
instrumental sense - the Security Council’s 
endorsement has so far proved ritualistic, 
with few tangible effects. This experience 
suggests that ritualism may have become 
the anchoring point for international 
legal and institutional engagement with 
women’s participation, underscoring the 
enormity of the challenge to change 
this pattern. Since the adoption of SCR 
1325, the Security Council has repeatedly 
reiterated its frustration at the slow pace of 
change in this regard.33 Expressing “deep 
concern” about the continued “under-
representation of women at all stages of 
peace processes” (SCR 1889, preamble 
para. 7), in 2009 the Security Council asked 
the Secretary-General to prepare a report 
examining the problem of women’s under-
representation (SCR 1889, para. 19). The 
resulting report identified a large number 
of barriers to women’s participation, which 
were entrenched in social conventions and/
or enshrined in legislation, including lack of 
physical security, low levels of confidence 
in the political process, stigma associated 
with political leadership, lower educational 
attainment, unequal division of domestic 
responsibilities and discriminatory social 
norms (paras. 15–22).34 An action plan, 
focused especially on the UN system, was 
proposed (paras. 25–52). Yet, three years 
later, in his 2013 report on WPS, while 
the Secretary-General finds a modest 
increase in the representation of women 
in formal peace negotiations, the numbers 
of women elected to parliaments in post-
conflict societies and serving as ministers 
had dropped.35 Adding to the long line 
of appeals, the most recent SCR 2242 
emphasizes the need for aid to be directed 
towards women’s “empowerment” (paras. 
2 and 15) and stresses the importance of 
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peacekeeping operations is also repeatedly 
encouraged (SCR 1820, para. 8; SCR 1888, 
preamble para. 15; SCR 1960, preamble 
para. 16, para. 15; SCR 2106, para. 14; 
SCR 2122, para. 9; SCR 2242, para. 8). 
The hope of many feminists is that these 
references mark a break in the entrenched 
practice of “seeing” women in the context 
of armed conflict, if they appear at all, only 
as a vulnerable group needing, in particular, 
(military) protection from sexual violence. 
In opening these opportunities for women’s 
voices to be heard, and their agency as 
full participants in civil and political life to 
be recognized, it is important to examine 
exactly how, and for what purposes, the 
WPS resolutions anticipate that women’s 
perspectives will be engaged. Will women’s 
participation be limited to making 
“feminized” contributions, for example 
by assuming domesticating and pacifying 
roles in the immediate post-conflict period 
or contributing to the design of “civilized” 
rules and practices aimed at saving or 
protecting women in the global South?30 
Or will women be admitted as full and 
equal participants in conflict prevention 
and resolution, and in peacebuilding, able 
to question militarism and promote the 
positive peace envisaged by the women’s 
peace movement? The rationale for 
women’s participation offered in the sexual 
violence resolutions provides a salutary 
answer. For example, employing more 
women in peacekeeping military and police 
contingents is promoted instrumentally, as 
a way to provide better protection for local 
women and children against sexual violence 
(SCR 1820, para. 8; SCR 1960, para. 15) and 
increase their willingness to report sexual 
violence (SCR 1960, preamble para. 16), 
as if these are contributions which women 
are inherently predisposed to making.31 
Further, as Sheri Gibbings has found, even 
in their role as “peacemakers,” women are 
severely constrained by the UN’s discursive 
norms of speech and conduct, which make 
it impossible for critical, anti-imperial and 
anti-militarist views to be “heard” within 
the terms of the Security Council’s WPS 
6their “meaningful” participation (paras. 1 
and 16). Perhaps the problem lies in the 
top-down, imperial direction of promoting 
change through Security Council resolutions. 
This might explain the findings of Christine 
Bell and Catherine O’Rourke that, despite 
a rise in references to women in post-SCR 
1325 peace agreements where the UN was 
a third party to negotiations (from four to 
twelve percent), more localized agreements 
that did not have the UN in such a role 
also saw a rise over the same period (from 
seven to fourteen percent). That the latter 
category of peace agreements continues 
to show a higher incidence of references 
to women suggests that locally-driven 
processes may be marginally more open 
to influences from outside military-politico 
elites and more responsive to innovative 
attempts to increase the participation of 
women’s organizations and other civil 
society groups.36
The idea that the WPS resolutions provide 
new leverage for local women’s peace and 
human rights organizations to insist on their 
inclusion in peace processes, and to craft 
their own peacemaking and peacebuilding 
projects, has also been questioned. There are 
certainly hopeful accounts of local activists 
managing to breathe life into the resolutions 
– to demand women’s participation in peace 
negotiations37, to ensure women’s rights 
are recognized in new constitutions38, to 
promote the rights of widows39, to gain 
support for local women’s projects40 and 
to foster feminist reconceptualizations of 
security.41 Yet, on closer inspection, much of 
the activism by local women’s organizations 
has involved raising awareness about the 
resolutions themselves, and lobbying 
governments and UN agencies to implement 
them, rather than using them as a means 
to support locally resonant community-
controlled peacebuilding work outside 
the discursive limits of the resolutions.42 
A six-country field study, which sought 
women’s views about the relevance and 
impact of SCR 1325, found that civil society 
organizations, despite security threats and 
few resources, “have been the engine 
behind the UNSCR 1325 movement,” but 
noted “the pressure to adopt the women, 
peace and security agenda and be seen to 
be ‘doing something,’” which has resulted 
in groups “basically repackaging existing 
programmes under the UNSCR 1325 
umbrella ... the substance [of which] is not 
necessarily well-adapted or tied to ongoing 
policy processes”.43 If the impact of the WPS 
resolutions, and the funding that follows 
them, is to compel women’s grassroots 
organizations to reinvent themselves in 
the protective and legalistic terms of the 
resolutions, or otherwise be discredited, 
then grass roots feminist change is being 
actively discouraged.44 The pressure to 
deliver a “result” that is recognizable as 
such by the Security Council threatens 
to disempower women’s grassroots 
movements for peace − the very subjects 
of feminism’s transformative hope.
2. UNIVERSAL 
DISARMAMENT 
(PREVENTION)
In contrast to the ritualistic engagement 
of the Security Council with women’s 
participation, the WPS resolutions are 
completely silent about the long-standing 
feminist goal of general disarmament. 
This silence is even more glaring when 
the numerous formal commitments to 
disarmament during the Cold War are 
recalled. In 1946, the General Assembly 
recognized that international peace and 
security was “closely connected” to 
disarmament, and urged the Security 
Council to take prompt measures to ensure 
the general regulation and reduction of 
armaments and armed forces.45 Subsequent 
resolutions were adopted in 1957 and 
1959 promoting general and complete 
disarmament46 and, in the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations (1970), states undertook 
to “pursue in good faith negotiations for 
the early conclusion of a universal treaty 
on general and complete disarmament.”47 
Outside feminist circles, strong support 
for disarmament came from the Non-
36  Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke 
“Peace Agreements or Pieces of Paper? 
The Impact of UNSC Resolution 1325 on 
Peace Processes and Their Agreements,” 
International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 59 (2010), 972–73.
37 CARE International, From Resolution to 
Reality: Lessons Learned from Afghanistan, 
Nepal and Uganda on Women’s 
Participation in Peacebuilding and Post-
Conflict Governance (CARE International, 
2011).
38 United Nations, General Assembly, Report 
of the Secretary-General: Women’s 
Participation in Peacebuilding, para. 69.
39 M. Owen, “Widowhood Issues in the 
Context of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1325,” International Feminist 
Journal of Politics 13 (2011), 616–22.
40 Sharon Bhagwan Rolls, “Thinking Globally 
and Acting Locally: Linking Women, Peace 
and Security in the Pacific,” in Rethinking 
Peacekeeping, Gender Equality and 
Collective Security, ed. Gina Heathcote and 
Dianne Otto. (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 
2014): 118-30.
41 Laura McLeod, “Configurations of Post-
Conflict: Impacts of Representations 
of Conflict and Post-Conflict upon the 
(Political) Translations of Gender Security 
within UNSCR 1325,” International Feminist 
Journal of Politics 13 (2011), 601–03.
42 Vanessa Farr, “UNSCR 1325 and Women’s 
Peace Activism in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory,” International Feminist Journal of 
Politics 13 (2011): 539–56.
43 S. N. Anderlini, “What the Women Say: 
Participation and UNSCR 1325 - A Case Study 
Assessment” (Washington, DC: International 
Civil Society Action Network, 2010), 42-43. 
44 Sophie Richter-Devroe, “‘Here It’s Not about 
Conflict Resolution − We Can Only Resist’: 
Palestinian Women’s Activism in Conflict 
Resolution and Non-Violent Resistance,” 
in Women and War in the Middle East: 
Transnational Perspectives, ed. N. Al-Ali and 
N. Pratt, (London: Zed Books, 2009), 158–92.
45 GA, Resolution 41(I), “Principles Governing 
the General Regulation and Reduction of 
Armaments,” UN Doc. A/RES/41(I), December 
14, 1946.
46 GA, Resolution 1148(XII), “Regulation, 
Limitation and Balanced Reduction of 
All Armed Forces and All Armaments; 
Conclusion of an International Convention 
(Treaty) on the Reduction of Armaments 
and the Prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen 
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 
UN Doc. A/RES/1148(XII), November 14, 
1957; GA, Resolution 1378(XIV), “General 
and Complete Disarmament,” UN Doc. A/
RES/1378(XIV), November 20, 1959.
47 GA, Resolution 25/2625, “Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations,” UN Doc. A/RES/25/2625, 
October 24, 1970.
 
Aligned Movement, which, at its founding 
conference in Bandung in 1955, had 
declared that “universal disarmament is 
an absolute necessity for the preservation 
of peace”.48 Links with feminist support 
for disarmament were recognized in some 
statements, including at the 1985 Nairobi 
World Conference on Women, where 
states called for women to actively support 
“the halting of the arms race, followed 
by arms reduction and the attainment of 
a general and complete disarmament”49 
and, as recently as 1995, at the follow-
up conference in Beijing, where states 
undertook to “work actively towards 
general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control” 
and to foster a “culture of peace”.50
Yet by 2000, general disarmament did not 
even rate a mention in SCR 1325. Even 
the Security Council’s own responsibilities 
under the UN Charter, to establish systems 
to regulate weapons in order to ensure “the 
least diversion for armaments of the world’s 
human and economic resources” (art. 26), 
are not referred to. Nor do any of the other 
WPS resolutions give any indication that the 
Security Council might be ready to rethink 
its militarized approach to international 
peace and security in other ways by, for 
example, emphasizing the importance 
of developing new non-violent forms of 
conflict resolution or of fostering a culture of 
peace, despite the resounding endorsement 
of such strategies at the Nairobi and Beijing 
conferences. 
The only references to disarmament in 
the WPS resolutions are in the context 
of disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, 
which, while important, is disarmament on a 
very small scale. Three of the empowerment 
resolutions are concerned that women 
and girls who have been combatants, or 
otherwise directly associated with supporting 
armed forces and groups, have access to 
DDR programmes, and that their “different 
needs” are addressed (SCR 1325, para. 13; 
SCR 1889, para. 13; SCR 2122, para. 4). 
+ 
Will women’s participation be limited to making 
“feminized” contributions... Or will women be admitted 
as full and equal participants in conflict prevention 
and resolution, and in peacebuilding, able to question 
militarism and promote the positive peace envisaged 
by the women’s peace movement? 
48 “Final Communiqué of the Asian-African 
Conference”, Bandung, Indonesia, April 24, 
1955.
49 World Conference to Review and Appraise 
the Achievements of the United Nations 
Decade for Women: Equality, Development 
and Peace, “Nairobi Forward-Looking 
Strategies,” UN Doc. A/CONF.116/28/Rev.1,  
July 26, 1985, para 250.
50 “Report of the Fourth World Conference on 
Women,” UN Doc. A/CONF.177/20, October 
17, 1995, paras. 143(f)(i) and 146.
Also three of the sexual violence resolutions 
highlight the need for mechanisms that 
provide protection for women from violence 
in DDR processes, particularly sexual violence 
(SCR 1820, para. 10; SCR 1888, preamble 
para. 12; SCR 2106, para. 16(a)). One 
positive consequence of these provisions 
is that the large numbers of women and 
girls involved directly in providing services, 
supporting, and fighting alongside men 
and boys on the front lines has become 
increasingly apparent, which also serves to 
counter the stereotype that women do not 
participate actively in armed conflict. While 
it is important to ensure that women are 
included in DDR processes, the focus is on 
disarming individuals in the post-conflict 
environment, rather than preventing the use 
of arms in the first place and dismantling 
the burgeoning arms industry.  
Even worse, instead of limiting the 
justifications for the use of arms, several of 
the WPS resolutions suggest that systematic 
violations of women’s rights could provide 
a new trigger for the collective use of 
force, particularly where sexual violence is 
used as a “tactic of war.” In three of the 
sexual violence resolutions, the Security 
Council expresses its “readiness,” “where 
necessary,” to take steps to address 
widespread or systematic sexual violence 
in situations on its agenda (SCR 1820, para. 
1; SCR 1888, para. 1; SCR 1960, para. 
81). Violations of women’s rights have also 
been employed as a justification for military 
occupation.51 As Gina Heathcote has argued, 
feminist ideas are being used by the Security 
Council to expand the legal justifications for 
the use of force (jus ad bellum) a profoundly 
anti-feminist project. Janet Halley and her 
colleagues, in the context of international 
criminal law, have also worried that official 
acknowledgment of rape as a “weapon of 
war,” even if condemnatory, may make rape 
more likely to be used in precisely that way.52 
While it could be argued that, in this move, 
women’s lives are more highly valued than 
previously – that their lives have come to 
matter and are thus “grievable” – the quid 
pro quo is that women are again conceived 
in protective terms and “valued” for their 
chastity and honour, rather than for their 
humanity.53 Further, I am not convinced that 
finding new pretexts for justifying the use 
of force can ever be defended as valuing 
human life more fully.
Closely related to disarmament, in the sense 
of avoiding the use of force, is the goal of 
conflict prevention. However, prevention is 
given little attention in the WPS resolutions. 
While there are a number of references 
to the “important” and “vital” role of 
women in conflict prevention, they show 
all the signs of ritualism, appearing mostly 
in preambular paragraphs and lacking any 
substantive content (SCR 1325, preamble 
para. 1; SCR 1820, preamble paras. 10 and 
11; SCR 1889, preamble paras. 6, 8, and 
10; SCR 2122, preamble paras. 12 and 13; 
SCR 2242, preamble para. 11). The few 
operative paragraphs that do refer to conflict 
prevention do not go beyond reiterating 
the need to invite women to participate in 
related discussions (SCR 1820, para. 12; 
SCR 2122, paras. 2(c) and 7; SCR 2242, 
paras. 1, 13 (preventing terrorism) and 15 
(preventing illicit transfer of arms). All the 
other references to “prevention” are about 
the need for measures to prevent sexual 
violence – and most of these, by contrast, 
appear in operative paragraphs that give 
them substance, such as calling for the 
establishment of monitoring and reporting 
mechanisms (SCR 1888, para. 11; SCR 2106, 
para. 6; SCR 2242, para. 10) and better 
prevention training for peacekeepers (SCR 
2106, para. 14; SCR 2242, para. 9). This 
provides a dramatic illustration of the way 
that the WPS agenda has served to refocus 
feminist attention from jus ad bellum, as a 
means of making armed conflict impossible, 
to making armed conflict safer for women 
(jus in bello) – as an end in itself.  
Today, the amassing of nuclear and 
conventional weapons is the preferred 
means of establishing international peace 
and security. The adoption of the Arms Trade 
Treaty in 2013 concedes as much, setting 
out to eradicate only the “illicit” trade in 
arms in an effort to keep weapons out of 
the hands of “untrustworthy” actors who 
intend to use them for illegal purposes.54 
Clearly, it is necessary to reaffirm the 
earlier connection between disarmament 
and peace. Yet the Security Council is the 
least likely of all international institutions 
to revive this connection, given that its five 
permanent members are host to the world’s 
largest arms producers. Other institutional 
locations must be found, or created, 
where thinking outside the frames of war 
is not only possible, but can be actively 
fostered, and where transformative anti-
militarist and anti-imperial cultures and 
practices of peace can be nurtured. The 
current work of the Human Rights Council 
towards drafting a Declaration on the Right 
to Peace,55 which includes promotion of 
general disarmament56 perhaps points to 
a better location, although member states 
are politically divided about the wisdom of 
this development.57
3. MEASURES TO PREVENT 
THE ADVERSE EFFECTS 
OF WAR ON WOMEN 
(PROTECTION)
Although the Hague Congress of Women 
rejected the idea that it was possible to 
humanize war through the development 
of jus in bello, and thereby protect women 
51  See, for example, the reference to SCR 
1325 in the resolution adopted by the 
Security Council which provided belated 
endorsement to the invasion and occupation 
of Iraq by the US and its allies in 2003: 
Security Council Resolution 1483, UN Doc. S/
RES/1483 (May 23, 2003).
52 Gina Heathcote, “Feminist Politics and the 
Use of Force: Theorising Feminist Action 
and Security Council Resolution 1325,” 
Socio-Legal Review 7 (2011): 23–43; Janet 
Halley et al., “From the International to the 
Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, 
Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: 
Four Studies in Contemporary Governance 
Feminism,” Harvard Journal of Gender and 
Law 29 (2006): 335–423.
53 Butler, Frames of War.
54 GA, Resolution 67/234, “The Arms Trade 
Treaty,” UN Doc. A/RES/67/234, January 4, 
2013.
55 UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 23/16, 
“Promotion of the Right to Peace,” UN Doc. 
A/HRC/RES/23/16, June 24, 2013.
56 Cecilia M. Bailliet and Kjetil Mujezinović 
Larsen, “Nordic Expert Consultation 
on the Right to Peace: Summary and 
Recommendations.” Nordic Journal of 
Human Rights 31(2) (2013): 262–78.
57 UN Watch. “The Proliferation of ‘Human 
Rights’: A Dictator’s Best Friend.”, July 4, 
2014: http://blog.unwatch.org/index.php/
category/right-to-peace/. 
from harm, they nevertheless protested 
the adverse effects of armed conflict on 
women (Resolution 2). These concerns, 
especially about sexual violence, were for 
many decades dismissed as unavoidable 
collateral damage and/or as the inevitable 
result of “boys being boys,” enjoying the 
spoils of war, despite its ubiquity.58 The 
condemnation of sexual violence, both 
during armed conflict and in its aftermath, 
in all of the WPS resolutions presents a 
striking contrast. Further, that four of the 
resolutions are entirely devoted to addressing 
the problem, attests to the inordinate focus 
– I would suggest panic – which sexual 
violence in armed conflict attracts today.59 
Even the empowerment resolutions employ 
their strongest language when it comes 
to condemning sexual violence, insisting 
that criminal justice must be applied 
and impunity must not be tolerated, 
shadowing successful feminist campaigns 
in international criminal law.60 For example, 
SCR 1325 urges parties to armed conflict to 
take “special measures” to protect women 
and girls from gender-based violence (para. 
10), and to end the impunity that attaches 
to perpetrators of war crimes, genocide, 
and crimes against humanity involving 
violence against women and girls (para. 11). 
Clearly, the Security Council is more at ease 
with casting women in a protective frame 
than treating them as equal participants 
in peacemaking and peacebuilding. I have 
argued previously that this protectionism 
serves to reinforce a general sense of the 
Security Council’s (masculine) fortitude and 
dependability, and provides reassurance 
about its commitment to protecting those 
vulnerable (feminized) civilians who need it, 
despite many indications to the contrary.61
While SCR 1325 urges the importance of 
addressing the broad band of “gender-based 
violence,” all of the following resolutions 
concern themselves with the narrower 
category of “sexual violence.” As Karen 
Engle has argued, this identifies sexual 
violence as the quintessential harm of war 
and deepens the sense of sexual panic.62 
The four resolutions that are concerned 
exclusively with sexual violence clearly 
support the view that the harm suffered is 
of the worst kind. They condemn the use 
of sexual violence not only as a “tactic of 
war,” but also as an impediment to the 
restoration of international peace and 
security (SCR 1820, para. 1; SCR 1888, 
para. 1; SCR 1960, para. 1; SCR 2106, para. 
1). According to SCR 1820, the horror of 
sexual harm even warrants “evacuation of 
women and children under imminent threat 
of sexual violence” (para. 3), which grants 
sexual violence victims a new position of 
privilege in communities affected by armed 
conflict. Their lives appear to have become 
lives that matter. But what purposes are 
being served by this heightened concern 
for some people’s safety? What about the 
women facing imminent death from a 
non-sexual armed attack, or the men who 
are at imminent risk of sexual violence, 
or the children who need emergency 
medical treatment? Prioritizing the rescue 
of women and children who are at risk 
of sexual violence does a lot of symbolic 
work for the Security Council, providing 
further reassurance about its determination 
to protect women and children, despite 
its “masculinized” military methods of 
securing and maintaining peace. The panic 
about sexual violence also serves the larger 
interests of the Security Council’s permanent 
members by diverting attention from the 
failure to attend to the underlying structural 
causes of armed conflict, in particular the 
inequitable distribution of global power and 
wealth, which continues to be reflected in 
poverty-stricken peacekeeping economies 
and the imposition of punishing free market 
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transformative anti-militarist and anti-imperial cultures 
and practices of peace can be nurtured.
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Envoy for the UN High Commissioner for 
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Criminal Law,” Michigan Journal of 
International Law 30(1) (2008): 1–123.
61 Otto, “The Security Council’s Alliance of 
‘Gender Legitimacy’”.
62 Karen Engle, “The Grip of Sexual Violence: 
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Dianne Otto (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 
2014): 23-47.
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economic systems by international economic 
institutions.
The sexual violence resolutions establish 
increasingly robust accountability 
mechanisms. SCR 1820 spells out a number 
of concrete measures to protect civilians 
from sexual violence (para. 3), and calls for 
the Secretary-General to prepare, in twelve 
months, an action plan for implementation 
(para. 15). Guided by this plan, SCR 1888 
calls for the appointment of a Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on 
Sexual Violence in Conflict (para. 4), a team 
of experts that can be rapidly deployed to 
situations of particular concern (para. 8), 
and more women’s protection advisers in 
peacekeeping operations (para. 12). A year 
later, SCR 1960 goes further by creating a 
system for listing parties to armed conflict, 
in situations on the Security Council’s 
agenda, that are “credibly suspected” 
of perpetrating sexual violence, so that 
focused measures such as  sanctions can 
be considered (para. 3), and calls for more 
effective and situational specific monitoring, 
analysis, and reporting arrangements 
(para. 8). Henceforth, the Secretary-
General is requested to submit specific 
annual reports on the implementation of 
the sexual violence resolutions (para. 18). 
Dissatisfied with the slow pace of change, 
the most recent of these resolutions urges 
accelerated implementation and also takes 
the important step of explicitly recognizing 
that sexual violence victims may include men 
and boys (SCR 2106, preamble para. 6).
While many feminists applauded the 
Security Council’s new-found concern 
with addressing sexual violence as an 
“historic achievement”63 and a long 
overdue admission that sexual violence 
during armed conflict is a matter that falls 
within its purview64, others worry that the 
fixation on sexual violence has distilled 
the multiplicitous issues associated with 
women’s experiences of armed conflict to 
the single issue of their sexual vulnerability, 
reducing the broad agenda of SCR1325 to 
the goal of making war safer for women, 
as if this was possible.65 Thus, engagement 
with the Security Council has shifted feminist 
attention from preventing war to attempting 
to ameliorate its adverse impacts on women. 
This development reflects a wider shift 
in anti-war activism, from concern with 
aggression to concern with “atrocity”.66 
While the more recent empowerment 
resolutions work hard to make up some 
of the lost ground, demanding attention 
to improving women’s socio-economic 
conditions through, inter alia, access to 
education, justice, and basic health services 
(SCR 1889, paras. 10 and 11), and affirming 
that “sustainable peace” requires a holistic 
approach that integrates political, security, 
development, human rights, the rule of law, 
and justice activities (SCR 2122, preamble 
para. 11), the larger goal of making resort 
to armed force impossible has been lost in 
the panic about sexual violence and the 
focus on jus in bello.
CONCLUSION
In many respects, the Security Council’s 
WPS agenda has cemented the idea that 
securing international peace relies on 
military strength and securitized states. 
Feminist aspirations for permanent peace 
have been reduced to seeking women’s 
participation in the decision-making 
structures of the existing frames of war, 
supporting disarmament only at the local 
level in post-conflict communities, and 
urging legal and practical reforms aimed 
at making armed conflict safer for women. 
This is not to deny the value of many of the 
hard-won achievements that have been 
made possible despite, more than because 
of, the Security Council’s vision. Among 
these achievements I would include the 
new openings for women’s participation, 
increased pressure to reduce conflict-related 
sexual violence and long-overdue recognition 
of the importance of local women’s projects 
aimed at peacemaking and peacebuilding. 
However, my argument is that, ultimately, 
these achievements are not enough – that 
the quid quo pro of the sacrifice of many 
63 Human Rights Watch, “UN: Finally, a Step 
Toward Confronting Rape in War,” News 
Release, June 18, 2008. 
64 PeaceWomen, “Feature Analysis: Security 
Council Resolution 1820: A Move to End Sexual 
Violence in Conflict,”, 1325 PeaceWomen 
E-Newsletter 102 (June 2008): 4–7.
65 Heathcote, “Feminist Politics and the Use of 
Force,” 23–43.
66 Samuel Moyn, “Anti-Impunity as Deflection of 
Argument,” in Anti-Impunity and the Human 
Rights Agenda, ed. Karen Engle, Zinaida 
Miller and D. M. Davis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming 2017).
components of the permanent peace that 
were identified by the Hague Congress 
in 1915 weighs heavily against feminist 
change. The result has been a weakening of 
feminist opposition to war, the solidification 
of protective stereotypes of women that lend 
support to military ways of thinking, and 
the loss of the hope for a world in which 
its “peoples” commit to “liv[ing] together 
in peace with one another” (UN Charter, 
preamble para. 2).
So, I return to the dilemma of gender that has 
always haunted feminist strategies for peace 
and the importance of critically examining 
how gender is being engaged and what it 
is that women’s increased participation in 
conflict and post-conflict decision-making is 
expected to achieve. I have argued elsewhere 
that the Security Council hopes thereby to 
improve its “gender legitimacy” and shore 
up support for its exercise of unaccountable 
power.67 Building its social capital in this way 
relies heavily on the gendered paradigm 
that men fight wars in order to protect 
women (and children), and that women are 
naturally predisposed to peace. The sexual 
violence resolutions clearly reinforce these 
ideas, while the women’s empowerment 
resolutions all slide into protectiveness 
as well.68 Instead of promoting increased 
women’s participation in the existing 
framework, feminist peace advocates need 
to expose the role that gendered ways of 
thinking play in framing armed conflict 
as inevitable, and develop strategies that 
contest and disrupt such certainties. This 
means fully embracing gender as a social 
category and engaging men and other 
genders, as well as women, in the project of 
peace. Dichotomous conceptions of gender 
need to be jettisoned if security institutions 
are ever to de-militarize, and only then will it 
be possible for people of all gender identities 
to enjoy equal political participation in all of 
its senses. In the context of the WPS agenda, 
men too must be engaged as peacemakers 
and recognized as potential victims of sexual 
violence, and peace must be conceived as a 
multi-gendered project, if the conservative 
moorings of biological determinism, which 
support the gendered grammars of war and 
peace, strength and vulnerability, are ever 
to be dislodged.
In order to extricate the idea of peace from 
the frames of war, we need to disrupt the 
relentless certainties of militarized security 
and gender dichotomy that have stifled 
change and kept us locked in the perpetual 
violence of “dirty peace,” justifying the 
production of ever more deadly weapons. 
We need to understand how to work against 
feminist ideas becoming bound up in global 
relations of inequitable power. We need to 
reframe peace as the creation of conditions 
that would make the response of violence 
unintelligible and nonsensical, drawing on 
all the resources at our disposal, including 
the rich history of feminist imaginaries 
of permanent peace, Third World visions 
of friendly relations, indigenous relations 
of harmony between people and land, 
and queer dreams of gender and sexual 
multiplicities. Realizing peace (non-violence) 
is an ongoing struggle against the violence 
that is part of our individual formative 
histories, and the need to find ways to 
resist repeating this violence is pressing. 
Engaging with the Security Council’s work 
on WPS reminds us of the urgency of the 
task of creating conditions conducive to 
positive peace, and its complexity, even 
as this experience suggests that we think 
again about the wisdom of looking to the 
Security Council as a vehicle for promoting 
permanent peace. 
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